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JEREMY RIFKIN: AN EXAMINATION OF THE EFFORTS OF AN ANTI-BIOTECHNOLOGY
ACTIVIST
INTRODUCTION
\The biotech revolution will aect every aspect of our lives. The way we eat; the way we date and marry; the
way we have our babies, the way our children are raised and educated; the way we work; the way we engage
in politics; the way we express our faith; the way we perceive the world around us and our place in it... each
of us [will be forced] to put a mirror to our most deeply held values, making us ponder the ultimate question
of the purpose and meaning of existence."1 In this declaration we see both the tremendous awe with which
the promises and power of biotechnology are greeted, and the fear, even trepidation, with which the potential
changes it could wrought on human existence is viewed. Therein lies the problem.
\Biotechnology" is broadly dened as \the application of biological systems and organisms to technical and
industrial processes."2 This broad category includes the use of cell fusion technology to produce biological
entities such as antibodies and the process of genetic engineering. The latter process involves the manipulation
of the genetic code of living organisms, primarily through the method of recombinant DNA. It is primarily
this ability to control the genetic blueprint that has given rise to the controversies surrounding biotechnology.
However, because genetic engineering is so intimately associated with biotechnology generally, and its power
is so overwhelming that it has largely supplanted traditional biotechnology methods, much of the opposition
against genetic engineering has been directed to biotechnology as a whole.
1It would be no exaggeration to say that since its advent about two decades ago, genetic engineering has
revolutionized the life sciences and the pharmaceutical industry. The technology, in its various conceptions
and applications, is now manifested in a wide range of applications in the agricultural and food industry, in
unprecedented medical and healthcare innovations, and in the functional structure of the workplace. The
recent report of a breakthrough in cloning of a sheep from an adult cell is a representative discovery that
illustrates the wondrous possibilities of this technology.
It is really no wonder that biotechnology in the form of genetic engineering would not be accorded unequivocal
acceptance. In the early days of the technique, even some molecular biologists were uncomfortable with
the implications of recombining genetic material (DNA). This wariness lead to a worldwide moratorium on
recombinant DNA experiments in 1973 and 1974. The moratorium was followed in 1975 by a gathering of
scientists at the Asilomar Conference Center in Pacic Grove, California, where a set of recombinant DNA
research guidelines were produced. At the same time, the public, provoked by anti-biotech activists abetted
by an uncritical media, was whipped into a frenzy by claims of accidental outbreaks of infectious cancer and
possible release of genetically-modied bacteria from university laboratories.3
2The hysteria eventually subsided when it soon became obvious that biotechnology was not about to lead to
the apocalypse. However, the same controversies and concerns re-surfaced to dog the biotechnology industry
during the 1980's, albeit in less outlandish incarnations, when the rst industrial fruits of genetic engineering
arrived in the marketplace. At this point, the Food and Drug Administration, which was the agency charged
with regulating the foods and drugs sold to the American public, was faced with a dicult task. It had to
promulgate rules and policies relating to biotechnology that were to be at once fair to the industry while true
to the agency's mission of protecting the health and safety of the people and the environment. This task was
confounded by the activities of citizen-activists who disagreed with the agency seemingly at every step of the
way. The challenges the FDA faced in dealing with the rst genetically engineered commercial products have
not abated, and are expected to intensify as we enter a new era of biotechnology.
The capability to clone a viable mammal from an adult cell, and the specter of imminent cloning of human
individuals that accompanies it, illustrates how future biotechnology products will likely extend beyond mere
genetically engineered versions of presently existing molecules (for instance, genetically engineered version
of the naturally-existing hormone insulin). Potential products include germline gene alterations, laboratory-
grown body parts, genetically-designed babies and human cloning. As a new wave of biotechnology products
is set to enter the marketplace, we will see the re-emergence of the many questions about how much, and
whether at all, to permit the development of this technology. And, undoubtedly, the FDA will once again be
at the forefront of the battle over how to regulate these products.4
3This paper attempts retrospectively to examine the impact of the eorts of Jeremy Rifkin on the rules and reg-
ulation, and ultimately the mission, of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) pertaining to biotechnology.
Rifkin arguably single-handedly raised the consciousness of the American public, and indeed the world, to the
potential risks of the technology, at least as he saw them. In this way, he positioned himself as a biotechnology
gady who became the bane of the biotechnology industry and federal agencies regulating biotechnology. It
seems tting, therefore, to study the impact of anti-biotechnology activism on federal regulation of biotech-
nology by focusing on Rifkin's eorts.
In the course of examining Rifkin's activities that were targeted specically at the FDA, this paper also dis-
cusses his eorts aimed at curbing recombinant DNA research regulated by the National Institutes of Health
and genetic engineering activities that fell under the jurisdiction of the United States Department of Agricul-
ture (USDA) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The reasons for this are several-fold.
First, regulatory changes in non-FDA federal agencies that have jurisdiction over biotechnology can have a
direct impact upon FDA regulations. The FDA, USDA, EPA, NIH, Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration (OSHA) and National Science Foundation (NSF) are federal agencies that are collectively charged with
insuring the safety of biotechnology research and products within a coordinated framework for the regulation
of biotechnology.5 One of the basic principles of the coordinated framework of regulation is the promulgation
of consistent regulatory policies among the agencies.6 In this regard, the FDA has demonstrated its adherence
to this principle. In some instances, it has adopted the relevant regulations from other agencies within the
Coordinated Framework instead of promulgating its own regulations.7 Thus, the impact of Rifkin's activities
on non-FDA agencies has on occasion extended to the FDA as well.
Second, the FDA's function in ensuring the safety of biotechnology products is dependent on the proper ow of
biotechnology products through the research pipeline. The vibrancy of biotechnology research is at least partly
dependent on how much regulation is imposed on it by regulatory agencies such as the EPA (e.g., regulation
of bio-pesticides) and USDA (e.g., eld testing of genetically-modied organisms). Thus, any obstruction of
research through increased regulation forced by activists such as Rifkin would impede ow of biotechnology
products to the FDA review stage, thus ultimately aecting the FDA's function by limiting the number and
variety of products that it gets to assess.
4BIOGRAPHY OF JEREMY RIFKIN
Early years
Jeremy Rifkin graduated the Wharton School of Finance at the University of Pennsylvania and the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University with a bachelor degree in economics and a master's de-
gree in international aairs, respectively. His social activism began in the 1960s. Among his self-proclaimed
accomplishments are helping to organize student opposition to germ-warfare projects at the University of
Pennsylvania in 1966 and sponsoring the rst national anti-Vietnam War rally in 1967. He later served as
national coordinator for the National Committee for a Citizens Commission of Inquiry on U.S. War Crimes in
Vietnam. In 1971, he co-founded the radical New American Movement (NAM), which was a leftist political
group. Through this movement, Rifkin pushed for the formation of a forum for mass media exposure as a
mechanism for raising political awareness and to promote NAM and other radical activities and demands, thus
foreshadowing his subsequent skillful engagement of the mass media in his crusade against biotechnology. In
1972, the Peoples Bicentennial Commission (PBC) was born. Through this forum, Rifkin engaged in activities
that he characterized as a new American Revolution aimed at creating fundamental changes in social, economic
and political institutions. These changes were to include indictment of economic freedoms and the accompany-
ing prosperity. He believed in the elevation of human rights above property values, identifying personal rights
with the collective interest. In his view, health care was a human right instead of a market commodity to be
sold to the highest bidder { technology was made to serve rather than to exploit man and the environment,
and production for prot was to be replaced by production based on human need and peace.8
Rifkin exhibited his attention-garnering talent early in his career. His PBC once sent tape recordings to 8,000
wives of America's top corporate executives urging the women to question their husbands about corporate
wrongdoing and corruption. It also announced a $25,000 reward oer to over 10,000 secretaries for informa-
tion leading directly to the arrest, prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment of chief ocials of Fortune 500
corporations for criminal corporate activities.9
Following a conspicuous lack of success through the PBC's activities, Rifkin turned his attention to the phar-
maceutical industry's experiments with DNA. This switch was accompanied by a change of name for the PBC
(which had earlier been changed from the Peoples Bicentennial Commission to the Peoples Business Commis-
sion) to the Foundation on Economic Trends (FET). He believed that there should be public control over the
prospects of formation of \new forms of life" through this technique. It turned out that this concern signied
the germination of a subsequent headlong plunge into the anti-biotechnology crusade that was to catapult him
into national prominence.10
5At a meeting of molecular biologists at the National Academy of Sciences in 1977, Rifkin made his debut
as a high-prole anti-genetic engineering activist by leading a protest that included protesters surrounding
the audience during a conference session and the singing of \We shall not be cloned." Interestingly, the
aggressive protest had only an equivocal impact on the conference participants. One of the scientist participants
characterized it as \more amusing than threatening."11 This protest, and the equivocal, almost dismissive,
response it received, was to parallel Rifkin's subsequent activities and the reception of most biotechnology
proponents.
In the 1980's, as a result of his unique brand of anti-biotechnology crusading activities, Rifkin received wide
media attention. The media took to viewing him as \the biotechnology revolution's leading counterrevolution-
ary"12 and \biotechnology's most outspoken critic."13
The substantial amount of attention Rifkin received belied the size of the organization through which Rifkin
engaged his gady activities, the FET. The FET, at the height of its prominence, consisted of Rifkin, one
assistant, one secretary and two lawyers. It did not have members, and ran on a small budget of a couple
of hundred thousand dollars annually generated from Rifkin's speaking fees and the sale of his books.14 Its
stated purpose was, and continues to be, to engage in activities centered around the environmental, ethical
and economic concerns raised by the development of emerging technologies.15
6Jeremy Rifkin has been a prolic writer. He is the author of about a dozen books that cover a wide range of
topics.16 In a number of his books, he espouses his conception of the world, and, relatedly, how technological
changes would aect it. In \Entropy," he discusses the synthesis of environmental and economic theory while
seeking to lay the groundwork for notions of sustainable development.17 In \Who Should Play God?", he (and
co-author) plainly voices his opposition to genetic engineering, claiming the technology would be as deadly as
a nuclear holocaust. He suggests that the crucial question human beings are faced with in dealing with the
technology is whether to preserve human species and other life forms as they exist or to forge ahead on a mass
program of biological reengineering.18 In \Algeny," Rifkin attempts to elucidate the social underpinnings of
Darwin's theory of evolution, arguing that the theory is more an attempt to make sense of the social changes
resulting from the advent of the Industrial Age than a reection of scientic truth. In this book, Rifkin draws
parallels between Darwinism and what he perceives to be a new view of the world as proposed by scientists
of the genetic engineering era.19 In \Biosphere Politics," he explores how the last ve centuries of human
history have shaped our relationship to the natural world.20 In \The Biotech Century," he attempts to draw
parallels between the bioscientic and informational technologies. He predicted that the next century will see
the emergence of technological advances that combine computer technology and biological properties; Rifkin
views this as portending an era of unprecedented changes to how humans view themselves and the world
around them. While the views he expounds in his books are not without their detractors21, it is clear that
through his books he has sought to reach the public with the philosophical underpinnings of his objection to
technology, specically biotechnology.22
7Rifkin's Motivation for Opposing Biotechnology
The unifying principle in the vast and diverse philosophical motivations driving Jeremy Rifkin's opposition
to biotechnology seems to be \fear" of unknown risks. Rifkin has been opposed to biotechnology for a long
time (20 years). Over this period, biotechnology has seen unprecedented and rapid development. Because
of this, it is dicult to pinpoint precisely what motivated Rifkin at each of the time points when he was most
publicly and vigorously opposed to particular biotechnology events. Moreover, he has expressed conicting
expectations from his eorts, and his views and concerns have likely evolved over time. Nonetheless, broadly
speaking, his motivations appear to be premised in fear of several distinct consequences he expects to result
from the technology of genetic engineering.
First, Rifkin seems motivated by fears of the technology itself. He believes the new genetic science to be unlike
any other technology the history of humankind has ever seen, in that it is capable of raising more troubling
issues than previous technologies ever did. This belief evidently arises from his conviction that genetic engi-
neering technology is uniquely capable of altering life, and indeed provides a tool for creating life itself.23 No
other previous technology portends this power.
Second, following from the all-powerful capability provided by this technology, Rifkin fears that one particu-
larly costly price of utilizing this technology is the evisceration of human self-denition. He believes that the
ability to manipulate our own genetic code represents the \ultimate expression of human control" in that it
enables human beings to determine how they want to be.24 It appears that his main concern is the erosion of
the precision of the denition of the term \human," because if humans can cause deliberate alteration to how
they are constituted, it would no longer be clear what a human actually is.
Third, driving Rifkin's fear of the loss of human self-denition is his rather negative view of human nature.
In his view, all humans have an innate desire to change themselves from their existing manifestation. In this
regard, he views genetic engineering as a \[representation of ] our fondest hopes and aspirations as well as
our darkest fears and misgivings." Indeed, genetic engineering are \dream tools" that grant us the power to
transform our vision of ourselves and our descendants.25 It is not clear, however, how he can be condent in
this particular conclusion about humanity. It may be that he is driven by a particularly pessimistic view of
human self-conception. A more cynical interpretation is that he believes he is endowed with a prescient insight
into the human psyche, and consequently bears the responsibility to protect humanity from itself.
Fourth, beyond alarm over the prospects of the loss of human self-denition, Rifkin is interested in the preser-
vation of \species integrity" in general. He expresses great concern over the loss of boundaries of separation
between species, and has promoted the notion of \species integrity," which he denes as the right to exist as
a separate, identiable creature.26 Rifkin argues that \each creature has a fundamental identity as a member
of a particular species... [and] animal breeding, without due regard and respect for the nature or `telos' of an
animal, may violate the animal's fundamental nature and convert it into something quite dierent."27 Genetic
engineering poses a threat never seen before, because, despite the more than ten millennia of domesticat-
ing, breeding and hybridizing animals, we have always been constrained by the natural biological limitations
imposed by \species borders." Genetic engineering, by transcending the species level to the genetic level,
bypasses these species constraints entirely.28 Thus, there are no longer any built-in biological limits to our
ability to alter the genetic blueprint of a species. This, in Rifkin's view, violates the moral and ethical canons
of civilization.29
Sixth, Rifkin fears the loss of genetic variety as a result of genetic engineering. According to him, while biotech-
nology has signicant value to agriculture and pharmaceuticals in the short run, the long term consequence is
negative because there will be depletion of certain genetic stock, leading to a loss of genetic variety.30 This
would apparently result from the tendency to preserve certain gene stock through recombination into a desired
target strain while eliminating strains with \bad" genes. Because \variety is an essential factor in the gene
pool," he worries that the world will become \a monoculture" that is not sustainable.31
Seventh, Rifkin fears that human life would be devalued by the process of genetic engineering. He predicts
that in the age of biotechnology, separate species will no longer be identied by separate names, but rather
will be categorized as systems of information \that can be reprogrammed into an innite number of biological
combinations." He anticipates that the biotechnology age will see living beings described as \a very specic
pattern of information unfolding over a period of time."32 He suggests that reduction of human life to a mere
bundle of genetic information will make engineering of human life more palatable by virtue of the latter being
viewed as simply the engineering of a system of information. Moreover, the notion that life will be viewed
merely as information further supports his argument that genetic engineering inevitably desancties human
life.33
Eighth, Rifkin worries that society is embracing biotechnology without fully realizing the consequences of doing
so. He cautions against assuming genetic engineering technology is a done deal, and implores us, more than
two decades after the discovery of recombinant DNA technology, to engage in public discourse about the costs
and benets of embracing this technology. In his view, the question of how high of a price we want to pay
for allowing this technology to enter our lives is one that continually haunts us. Thus, he believes the most
important issue is to make the technology an issue of public attention.34
Ninth, compounding his concern that society is blindly accepting genetic engineering technology is his fear
that the people who should know better are also blindly doing so. He accuses scientists, corporate leaders and
politicians of being seduced by the short-term benets of the extraordinary power oered by the new technol-
ogy. Indeed, he believes that these individuals promote the virtues of the technology too enthusiastically, so
that even doubters are swept up in momentary excitement. Rifkin suggests that these people should be more
mindful of history's lessons in relation to past technological advances. He questions the reasonableness of these
individuals' action, because he wonders how any reasonable person could believe the unprecedented power of
genetic engineering would be without substantial risk.35
Tenth, not only does he fear naivete on the part of scientists, he suspects they cannot be depended upon to
make the right decisions in adopting the technology. He believes that scientists have a selsh interest in ad-
hering to a purely scientically-detached view of the notion of \speciesness" and \beingness." Because genetic
engineering deals with changing the \natural" state of living entities, he concludes that scientists have a vested
interest in not acknowledging any intrinsic value or identity in the species.36 He expects scientists to count
among the special interest groups who have much to gain from the speedy introduction and acceptance of
their inventions.37 It follows, then, that Rifkin does not trust scientists to be the arbiter of what technology
is appropriate and what risks it entails.
Eleventh, not only does Rifkin not trust scientists to be neutral judges of the appropriateness and costs of their
invention, he is concerned that molecular biologists have a critically-awed value system regarding the world
around them. He realizes that many scientists have, and continue to, soundly reject his notion of intrinsic value
and speciesness, relegating such thoughts to the realm of \mysticism" that doesn't belong in a scientic debate.
Yet, to this day, he insists that it is these scientists who should change how they perceive the natural world; on
this point he cites the support of \a growing number" of environmental scientists.38 Moreover, he asserts that
these molecular biologists' value system is completely out of synch with the opinion of the American public.39
Twelfth, he fears that scientists are repeating the mistakes of Darwinism. Darwinism, according to Rifkin's
analysis, is not so much a theory for scientic truth, but rather a view of nature that is \heavily inuenced
by the social gestalt of the times," namely the changes resulting from the Industrial Revolution of Charles
Darwin's time.40 Similarly, he fears that present-day molecular biologists are repeating this mistake. They are
justifying their intrusion into the genetic code by redening \an organism as [not] a discrete entity but rather
as a temporary set of relationships existing in a uid context, on the way to becoming something else."41
Thus, under this new cosmology (view of the world), scientists are able to transform and re-dene genetic
blueprints of existing organisms without any compunction, because the new cosmology allows them to believe
their actions are consistent with the natural order.
Thirteenth, Rifkin fears that a specie-less cosmology will be accompanied by a signicant philosophical trans-
formation. He expects humanity to reshape its view of existence to coincide with the new conception of how
species relationships are organized. In the process, he believes humanity will strive to improve existing organ-
isms and to design wholly new ones that would be more perfect versions of itself.42 Rifkin's disapproval of
this view is implicit in his choice of name for the new cosmology. In naming it \Algeny," he draws a parallel
to the ancient belief of alchemy, which was the belief that every metal was continually seeking to transform
itself, specically to become gold.43 It is not clear, however, why Rifkin seems certain that the new conception
of humanity's relationship with the nature around it is necessarily bad. What is obvious, though, is that he
prefers humanity to forsake a view that seeks to dominate nature for one that endeavors to work with nature.44
Fourteenth, beyond teleological concerns, Rifkin seems also to be fearful of the more tangible consequences of
genetic engineering. He argues that the new genetic engineering technologies raise \one of the most troubling
political questions in all of human history." That is, who should be entrusted with the authority to decide what
is a bad gene that should be eliminated and what is a good one that should be propagated.45 Extrapolating
from this question, he arrives at one of his biggest concerns, that of eugenics.46 He wonders whether there is
anyone who could be entrusted to make genetic determinations for us, and concludes that most of us would not
be willing to relinquish control in this regard. He worries, however, that our desire to increase our own personal
choices and options in a biological marketplace that is dominated with choices of choosing and enhancing our
genetic environment would ultimately result in our placing too much control in the hands of \others."47 In our
eagerness to take advantage of the benets of genetic engineering, we may end up surrendering our personhood
in the marketplace to \others," namely wily entities48 that possess control of the genetic technologies. What
is more fearsome, he evidently thinks, is that biotechnology seems to have a distinct beginning, marked by
consumers choosing from among many choices of genetic engineering products and services on the market, but
no real ending, in that the end is reached only when every bit of our personhood has been exchanged and we
no longer possess \the very thing we were so anxious to enrich { our humanity."49 Furthermore, he opines
that \concepts of nature [can] also serve as essential political instruments for eliciting unequivocal deference
and resignation" because authorities can justify their unjust, exploitative or repressive commands by claiming
them to be in accord with the natural order.50 In this regard, it appears that Rifkin is concerned about state
utilization of genetic technologies to construct and control the public. For instance, he has argued that gene
therapy applications will stigmatize culturally deviant individuals,51 that genetic information obtained by the
tools of biotechnology can be used to discriminate based on genetic prole,52 and that genetic engineering
could lead to eugenics as manifested in creation of a people with selected and desirable traits.53
8RIFKINS EFFORTS AGAINST RECOMBINANT DNA RESEARCH
A. AT THE RAC { RULE AND POLICY MAKING
In 1984, Jeremy Rifkin submitted a groundbreaking proposal to the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee
(RAC) of the National Institutes of Health.54 This proposal was subsequently debated at a RAC meeting on
October 29, 1984. At this meeting, Rifkin had the opportunity to debate his proposal with RAC members.55
The juxtaposition of his position against that of scientists as elaborated in letter comments and statements
made by RAC members provided an illuminating glimpse into Rifkin's rationale for opposing genetic engineer-
ing. This proposal represented one his earliest signicant eorts to thwart the progress of genetic engineering
technology.
9The proposal
In response to NIH and NSF-funded experiments (performed by Ralph Brinster at the University of Pennsyl-
vania) in which human genes regulating the growth hormone were being injected into sheep and pig embryos
for the express purpose of incorporating the human genes permanently into the germ line of these mammalian
animals, Rifkin proposed an amendment to the NIH guidelines for recombinant DNA experiment. He claimed
that the germline transfer experiments represented only the second time in history that a portion of the genetic
complement of humans was being transferred into the genetic code of another species.56 He proposed that the
NIH prohibit any experimentation involving the transfer of a genetic trait from one mammalian species into
the germ line of another unrelated mammalian species; \unrelated" was to be dened as any two species that
cannot mate and produce one generation of ospring either in the wild or under pre-existing domestic breed-
ing programs. The guideline was to encompass all mammalian species, including homo sapiens. The agency
was immediately to discontinue funding all experimental research involving the transfer of genetic traits from
one mammalian species into the germ line of another unrelated mammalian species and must instruct all in-
stitutions receiving NIH grants that any such experimentation using private funds would be grounds for the
immediate suspension of all NIH research grants to the institution. In addition, all private companies signatory
to license agreements with NIH-funded institutions were to be bound by the NIH prohibition as well.57
Rifkin's stated purpose for the prohibition was the protection of the biological integrity of every mammalian
species, which, in his opinion, was a goal already reected in the policy underlying many then-existing federal
statutes.58 He argued that crossing of species borders and incorporating genetic traits from one species directly
into the germ line of another represent a fundamental assault on principles of species integrity and constitute
a violation of every species' right to exist as a distinct creature.59
Rifkin further argued for symmetrical treatment of human and non-human species. He claimed that since most
human beings would condemn attempts to introduce animal genes permanently into the germ line of humans
as a \gross and unconscionable" breach of our telos as a species, his proposal would establish the counterpart
principle that experiments involving transfer of foreign genes into non-human species would violate the telos
of the transferee species, and would therefore be \morally reprehensible."60
Not wishing to stop at mammalian species, he wanted the same principle of species integrity to apply to
non-mammalian species as well. Therefore he asked that the RAC establish a working sub-group to propose
additional protocols or guidelines necessary to ensure compliance with \the spirit" of his proposal in regard to
the protection of the germ line of all species.61
In a subsequent letter (following the rst letter describing his proposal) to the NIH, Rifkin submitted an addi-
tional item for placement on the agenda of the RAC to be debated in conjunction with his original proposal.
The amendment proposed NIH prohibition of germline genetic transfer between human beings specically and
other mammalian species. It is not clear why Rifkin thought it necessary to emphasize experiments involving
human beings in particular when his original proposal relating to mammalian species generally by denition
included humans.62
Interestingly, the proposed amendment ended by having the NIH declare experimentation involving the trans-
fer of genetic traits between animal and human germ lines to be \morally and ethically unacceptable." This
injected an explicit non-scientic, non-objective consideration into the debate about genetic transfer experi-
ments.63
At the RAC meeting on October 29, 1984, Rifkin further explained the reasoning behind his proposal. He
stated that while closely related species may be bred by traditional breeding means, nature limited what could
be accomplished, because \species walls [and] mating boundaries establish some limits as to the kind of re-
combination that may occur through natural methods." He argued that gene transfer from one mammalian
species into another species is qualitatively dierent from these traditional breeding programs.64
In Rifkin's view, the unit of manipulation in genetic engineering experiments is the gene itself, whereas the
biological unit in the past was the organism. Thus, with genetic transfer, the unit of importance has ceased to
be the species itself. He saw this as society's long and protracted journey towards a reshaping of its concept
of life so that increasingly the importance of life is viewed at the genetic, rather than species, level.65
Rifkin accused scientists who argued that the gene transfer experiments were not unique, but rather were
simply a chemical transfer, of engaging in a form of scientic reductionism. He reasoned that if a gene is
viewed simply as a chemical, then every other gene that makes up the human species would also simply be a
chemical. He worried that this would be a slippery slope approach that could lead to a point when it is too
late (he suggested this to be the point when the animal takes on human characteristics) to ask the necessary
and appropriate questions about these experiments.66
Contradicting his own demand for prohibition against gene transfer between human and non-human species,
he also implored the RAC to develop criteria for determining what human genes should or should not be
transferred into other species. He warned that if the RAC failed to do so, all human genes could potentially be
transferred to other species for short-term medical or economic benet. This possibility, he contended, would
pose a major ethical and policy question. In support of his contention, he noted that several scientists, such
as the noted then-director of the Whitehead Institute at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dr. David
Baltimore, agreed that some ethical questions could arise in experiments involving gene transfer from other
species into the human germ line. Rifkin reasoned that if such experiments posed ethical problems, transfers
from humans to other species should similarly be ethically problematic.67
Rifkin concluded his presentation to the committee by chastising scientists for thinking that the American
public was not educated and that they could not possibly understand all the complex questions raised by the
technology, and for claiming that any fears were unfounded. He reminded them that genetic engineering was
the most powerful instrument capable of changing the biology of the planet humankind had ever had, and so
the American public had every right to believe there would be ethical and social questions at each stage of
the development of the technology. In his view, the experiments he was addressing represented a fundamental
precedent stage. Thus, a committee vote against his proposal would be tantamount to a declaration that there
was no ethical problem with proceeding with genetic trait transfer between species, and that that would be
the accepted policy of the United States Government.68
10Response to Proposal
Prior to the RAC meeting, a total of 359 letters with 433 signatures opposing Rifkin's proposal were received
from the general public, scientists and organizations. One letter with 1 signature supported it. These letter
comments and the comments of RAC members in response to the proposal were directed at several distinct
issues.69
There was great concern that important medical research should not be impeded. Commenters suggested that
the proposal would cause the discontinuance of important medical research relating to genetic disorders, cancer
and other diseases, and thus limit the search for a cure for genetic problems. Some pointed out that there
was a need for people born with good health to help those less blessed than they were, and one way to help
would be through research. Others pointed out that the proposal would prevent patients with autoimmune and
genetic diseases from availing themselves of treatment (presumable involving gene therapy) down the line when
future understanding showed safe ways to prevent such suerings and loss of life.70 Still others noted that since
knowledge from medical research is valuable to society, any prohibition required substantial justication, which
was deemed lacking in the proposal.71 It was pointed out that animal experimentation necessarily precedes
human trials for any kind of gene therapy treatments.72 One even went so far as to declare that the practical
benets of the type of research covered by the proposal were so unquestionable and irrefutable that it was
absurd even to consider that they should be outweighed by the \putative discomfort to a small number of
laboratory animals."73
Interspecies genetic transfer is an important medical research tool. It was pointed out that only when a gene is
injected into germ cells can the eect of the gene be seen in an entire organism, and only when a human gene
has been injected into another mammal can the embryological actions of a human gene be elucidated. This
is because such transfers are often a necessary part of protocols designed to understand how inserted genes
behave in host organisms; if the gene is not foreign to the host species, its activity cannot be distinguished
from that of the host.74 Indeed, interspecies gene transfer experiments were the only means available at the
time for studying gene regulation and the development of complex systems such as animals and humans.75
It was asserted that the American public wanted genetic engineering research to continue. A number of RAC
members pointed to the overwhelming public response to the proposal. One suggested that the American
public had expressed its view on the subject, calling attention to the several hundred letters from individuals
opposed to the proposed prohibition.76 One member noted the overwhelming public response to the Federal
Register announcement of the proposal, which is particularly unusual in light of past diculty in obtaining
public response to any type of announcement seeking comments. She argued that this suggested that many
in the country deemed the type of research in question to be extremely important.77 Moreover, the responses
were from a broad range of the society, including the general public; high ocers of academic and research
institutions in not just the sciences but also in the humanities and law; from private foundations dedicated
to improvement of human welfare; from organizations and individuals interested in animal welfare and food
production; and from individual citizens concerned about the future prospects for solving presently incurable
health problems.78
Some commenters denied that inter-species genetic transfer violated species integrity. They argued that one
or a few genes are not sucient to violate the integrity of a species. This is because individuals within species
possess only a portion of the gene pool of the entire species, and the gene pool is in constant dynamic evolution,
with gains and losses of genetic variation. Thus, introduction of \new" genetic material into a species would
actually aid in the species' survival (through genetic evolution) rather than harm it.79
Others argued that there is no basis for the notion of \species integrity." A number of individuals insisted
that there was no evidence to support any inviolate principle of species integrity. They argue that there is
a great commonality of genetic material among the species, and in fact inter-species genetic transfer occurs
naturally, albeit rarely. Moreover, genes are merely parts of systems and the same genes from dierent species
are often virtually identical; for example, genes of humans and dogs are not imprinted with human or canine
qualities.80 Indeed, some argued that the only \telos" (as Rifkin argued exists for every species) a species can
have is \extinction." In support of this argument, they contend that genetic studies have repeatedly conrmed
that the genetic makeup of organisms within a species is continually changing through natural processes, and
that genetic plasticity is a fundamental property of living beings.81 One RAC member went so far as to say
that it had been \utterly impossible" for the RAC even to arrive at a denition of a species, since species are
constantly evolving. Another questioned whether the notion of preserving mammalian species would ultimately
have to lead to a consideration of the \telos" of bacteria and viruses as well (which presumably is unreasonable
since these are entities that are the common causes of diseases and, consequently, the targets of eradication
eorts).82
It was also pointed out that gene transfer eorts were merely extensions of traditional breeding activity. It
was argued that genetic changes by modern methods were merely faster and more precise alternatives to
conventional breeding and selection programs.83
In several ad hominem attacks, Jeremy Rifkin was accused of possessing a awed character. A number of
individuals attacked Rifkin's integrity. They wondered if his view of morality was \sorely limited" since he
was seeking a blanket prohibition of genetic research on moral grounds, and yet did not seem to consider the
morality of allowing human genetic abnormalities, some of which cause great misery, to go unstudied when
the tools to study and possibly treat them were available.84 The then-Commissioner of the FDA even went so
far as to accuse Rifkin of engaging another \highly contrived" issue consistent with his character as someone
\whose nuisance to substance ratio is high."85 He was also chastised for behaving irresponsibly in ignoring
all that was known about genetics and evolution, and for having engaged in obfuscation of issues. He was
further accused of opposing clearly enumerated benets of the technology with \unsupported, mythical fears of
risks."86 Finally, he was faulted for engaging in hyperbole and scaremongering through catch phrases uttered
and written to engender public fear and garner media attention with \almost McCarthy-type tactics."87
The RAC committee insisted that it did not ignore public opinion. A RAC member vehemently refuted
Rifkin's assertion that RAC ignored the public. He noted that public members had long been part of RAC's
composition, and that RAC had actively sought public participation in its deliberations. On the contrary, he
said, it was Rifkin who \underestimate[d] the intelligence and knowledge of the public."88
Finally, it was asserted that the existing guidelines were adequate. One committee member responded to
Rifkin's accusation that RAC tended always to give permission for experiments to proceed. He pointed
out that this may have seemed to be the case only because NIH procedures had previously permitted local
institutional committees and review boards to approve human gene therapy protocols without RAC review
and NIH approval. However, the NIH Guidelines had since been reviewed to require a much more rigorous
process of national review.89 Thus, the committee member seemed to be asserting that Rifkin's accusation
was unfounded, since the RAC had simply not been involved in the approval of many past gene engineering
experiments.
11Rifkin's Response
In response to a motion for the RAC to reject the proposal, Rifkin sounded a rare conciliatory tone. He
acknowledged that RAC members were well-intentioned, for they would not be part of the medical research
community if they did not think they were trying to improve the welfare of humanity.90 He empathized with
the diculty for any profession to critique itself, but asked the members to examine their world view before
making any \hasty" decisions. He suggested that they re-evaluate their modern science assumptions and
consider that other people may not share their world view.91
He went on to reiterate his belief that the technology at hand was so powerful that the consequences and risks
had to be acknowledged, lest the costs be heaped on the ecosystem and future generations. He implied that it
was either na ve or disingenuous to believe there were no risks and no costs associated with the biotechnology
revolution. He felt it unreasonable that the scientic community should be given full license at every juncture to
pursue any kind of research in any area. In response to RAC members' argument that impeding biotechnology
research would lead to continued human suering, he argued that such an assertion suggested a syndrome of
fear. He questioned how RAC could \prematurely" conclude that the long-term benets outweighed the risks
when only a few gene transfer experiments had been carried out. He asked for a moratorium on this type of
research until a time when the relevant questions were being properly addressed by the American public.92
On a nal note, Rifkin suggested that the letters that had been received and quoted by the committee on his
proposal were not representative of an accurate cross-section of the American public.93 Thus, he implicitly
held onto his belief that his views were the more reective of those of the masses.
12RAC's counter-response
The committee bristled at Rifkin's characterization of their attitude toward gene transfer experimentation.
They rst suggested that Rifkin had either misunderstood or miscontrued their comments. They maintained
that rather than suggesting there were no problems associated with the experiments in question, they were
merely following an orderly process of consistently exercising care and prudence in approaching the utilization
of recombinant DNA technology. Moreover, they insisted that most of them had not spent just \one hour"
considering the issues at hand, as Rifkin had suggested, but rather had been thinking about them for years.
It was simply that they recognized there were risks associated with any new technology, and that a total
prohibition would prevent their ever learning whether the potential risks were real or mythical.94
Moreover, they argued that total prohibition in the United States would not stop such research from being
performed elsewhere. Such attempts at prohibition had not apparently ever worked, and thus the RAC should
continue to evaluate such experiments, so as to allow the United States Government to maintain its control
over them.95
The RAC refuted Rifkin's contention that its world view consisted only of seeing the benets of biotechnology
whereas he was singularly willing to point out the potential risks. On the contrary, one member said, the
dierence between Rifkin and the RAC was that, seeing both the risks and benets, Rifkin chose to prohibit
seeking the benets whereas the RAC would prefer to continue with maximizing benets while minimizing
risks.96 Another member wondered how a social problem (risk) could be successfully solved before the tech-
nological means was developed to address it.97
Finally, one RAC member expressed frustration with Rifkin's insatiable appetite for opposing biotechnology
research. The member noted that as soon as one his concerns was allayed, another concern surfaced. He
suggested that Rifkin was attempting to arrest a process that had been spectacularly successful.98
13Outcome
The RAC voted down the proposal by a unanimous vote.
B. LAWSUIT
Failing to persuade the NIH to change its stance on genetic transfer research, Rifkin, through FET, led a
lawsuit to enjoin research of this nature. The defendant in this suit was the USDA because of its funding and
facility support for the experiments.99
Foundation on Economic Trends v. Block100 { The \Animal Productivity Research" Case { District Court
The plaintis claimed that the USDA violated the NEPA by failing to prepare an environmental impact state-
ment on its animal productivity research, which included the very genetic transfer experiments being performed
by Ralph Brinster that had instigated Rifkin's proposal for prohibiting NIH support for such research.101 They
argued that the USDA's decision to focus its animal productivity research on developing faster growing, more
productive, and larger animals required an analysis of the resulting environmental impacts, and thus an impact
statement was necessary and should have been considered in the development of the USDA research program.
The complaint alleged that the USDA's research program had or would have signicant environmental, eco-
nomic, and social impact through forcing dislocations in the farm economy, aecting the gene pool of farm
and food animals, and polluting the air and water. The plaintis sought declaratory relief that the USDA
had violated the NEPA102 by preparing neither an environmental assessment nor an environmental impact
statement103 in connection with its research program (which included recombinant DNA experiments). They
also sought a nding against the defendants for violation of the Administrative Procedures Act through act-
ing arbitrarily and capriciously in not considering alternatives to its research programs for improving animal
productivity.104
14The Court concluded that the USDA's research activities did not constitute a \proposal for legislation or
other major Federal action signicantly aecting the environment," and therefore neither an environmental
assessment nor impact statement was required. It granted summary judgment to the defendants.105
Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng106 { The \Animal Productivity Research" Case { Appellate Court
The Appellate Court armed the lower court's summary judgment, but on dierent grounds. It found no
need to determine whether the USDA program posed a signicant impact to the environment because it did
not even constitute a proposal for action that required an NEPA impact statement. It further noted that the
plaintis' real objection related to the objectives of the scientic research being performed by the USDA.107 It
concluded this to be the case despite the plaintis' insistence that they were not objecting to selective breeding
technologies per se, nor to pathbreaking research projects involving the use of recombinant DNA techniques, but
rather were simply saying that an impact statement was required to evaluate the goals of animal productivity
research that is focused on developing faster growing, more productive, and larger animals.108 It is tempting
to speculate that the Court was wary of the plaintis' real objectives in ling the lawsuit: to use procedural
maneuvers to block all biotechnology research.
B.
OTHER LITIGATION AGAINST BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH
From the mid-1980's to the 1990s, Rifkin led a series of legal challenges against the USDA, NIH and EPA
(and later the FDA) actions that directly or indirectly related to biotechnology.
15The motivating factor for these lawsuits, in his own words, was that federal regulators were not interested in
listening to his viewpoint until \[the] interest [was framed] by forcing public policy to deal with court decisions."
Underlying this cynical view of the federal authorities was his belief that the government was simply not ready
(or willing) to regulate biotechnology.109 Relatedly, he felt that the lawsuits would serve as \educational tools
to get discussions [about assumptions and intentions underlying biotechnology] going... before the technology
[came] on line." Perhaps most importantly, as some would argue, he knew the lawsuits \[drove the] industry
nuts."110
Not surprisingly, advocates of biotechnology did not have a charitable view of Rifkin's motivations for the legal
challenges. They believed that Rifkin, after having failed \to intimidate" the NIH into prohibiting genetic
engineering research, had decided to turn to the EPA and USDA, which are softer targets by virtue of being
more politically vulnerable. They suspected that Rifkin's lawsuits (based always on procedural technicalities)
were motivated by a broader purpose, namely to engage in \a war against all genetic engineering," rather than
seeking merely to ensure that scientists not ignore federal biotechnology regulations.111
16Cases involving \Deliberate release of genetically engineered or-
ganisms"
Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler112 { District Court
This case arose from the NIH's decision to permit the rst government-approved release of a genetically en-
gineered organism into the environment. In the early 1980s, University of California researchers modied
a bacterium that in its naturally-occurring state has the ability to nucleate ice crystals. The modication,
achieved through recombinant DNA technology, resulted in deletion of the genetic code that normally confers
the bacterium's ice-making trait. Upon approval of a eld test of the modied bacteria involving its deliberate
release into the environment, Jeremy Rifkin, through the FET, led for an injunction against the experiment
until such time as the NIH had conducted and published an environmental impact statement.113
The District Court addressed the plaintis' complaint that the NIH had failed to issue appropriate environ-
mental impact statements as required by NEPA and in conformity with the regulations of the Council on
Environmental Quality.114 The gist of the plaintis' complaint was that a revision of NIH Guidelines in 1978
to permit deliberate release experiments and the authorization of such experiments constituted a \major federal
action." It deemed NIH's failure to precede the action with a documented \hard look" at the environmental
implications of that action to be tantamount to an NEPA violation.115 In deciding whether there was a likeli-
hood of plaintis succeeding on the merits, the Court concluded armatively on all three issues before it. It
found that the NIH had not fullled its NEPA obligations when it failed to (1) issue an environmental impact
statement for its 1978 revision to the NIH Guidelines which provided authority to permit deliberate-release
experimentation by NIH grantees;116 (2) issue any broad, programmatic environmental impact statement117
addressing the general environmental issues presented in NIH approval of deliberate release experiments; and
(3) issue an environmental assessment or an environmental impact statement addressing the specic environ-
mental issues associated with the rst deliberate release experiment to be conducted under the 1978 revised
NIH Guidelines. Consequently, the Court granted a preliminary injunction against the NIH from approving
or continuing to approve experiments involving deliberate release of recombinant DNA organisms. It also
enjoined the University of California from proceeding with the deliberate release experiment that the NIH had
approved.118
Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler119 { Appellate Court
17The decision of the District Court was appealed to the U. S. Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
Circuit. The Appellate Court armed in part and reversed in part.
The Court armed the lower court's injunction against the University of California experiment. In holding
so, it went to some length to emphasize its concern about the environmental risks that may result from such
experiments (although it did refrain from explicitly saying that it believed there was a likelihood of these
risks materializing). It implored the NIH to attempt to evaluate seriously the risk that emigration of the
genetically engineered organisms from test sites would cause ecological disruption, and suggested that until
such an evaluation was completed, the questions of whether an environmental impact statement was required
would remain open. It pointed out that one criterion for determining whether such a statement was required
was \the degree to which possible eects on the human environment are highly uncertain or involve unique or
unknown risks.120 Thus, the Court here was quite explicitly in agreement with Rifkin's concerns.
On the other hand, the Court vacated the lower court's injunction against NIH's approval of all deliberate
release experiments. It found that the district court's focus on the 1978 NIH Guidelines revision as a basis for
an injunction and requiring an environmental impact statement was inappropriate. It further found that, while
it thought a programmatic statement would be helpful, it was not certain as a matter of law that plaintis
would succeed in showing that the absence of a programmatic statement was a violation of the NEPA and the
Council on Environmental Quality's regulations.121
Unfortunately for Rifkin, he was excoriated in the concurring opinion. The concurring judge stated that
the plaintis should have brought its original concerns directly to the NIH. He noted that the Court would
\undoubtedly have had a better record [available to it in the case] if the Foundation on Economic Trends
had not failed to raise its objections while the matter was pending before the [NIH]." He pointed out that
public comments were solicited through the Federal Register, but none were forthcoming from the FET. He
conjectured that had the FET voiced its objections to the NIH, it was more than likely, \given the demonstrated
sensitivity of NIH and its scientists to such matters," the defendants would have responded to any objections.
He further blamed the FET's conduct for delaying the vital experiments in question for \a very considerable
period of time," and submitted that \the use of delaying tactics by those who fear and oppose scientic progress
[was] nothing new." Furthermore, the judge worried that a \national catastrophe" would result should the
development of the promising technology of genetic engineering be \crippled by the unconscionable delays...
brought about by litigants using the [NEPA and other environmental regulations]."122
Foundation on Economic Trends v. Thomas123 { The \Ice-Minus Bacteria" Case
The plaintis sought an injunction against the EPA's issuance of an experimental use permit124 to Advanced
Genetic Sciences, Inc. (AGS); the permit authorized AGS to conduct a eld test of bacterial strains similar to
the ones used by the University of California in Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler (see supra).
Prior to the ling of this lawsuit, the FET had challenged the EPA's initial scientic position that the AGS
experiment did not present foreseeable risk. The FET questioned the agency's conclusions about the bacteria's
novelty, competitiveness, pathogenicity, and atmospheric impact.125 After responding to the FET's concerns,
the EPA proceeded with granting the permit. The plaintis, not satised with the EPA response, responded
to the permit grant by ling suit the same day, alleging that the agency action violated the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), and was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion.126 Among
other complaints, they contended that the EPA improperly waived certain data submission requirements for
AGS in their permit application, and that the agency did not adequately consider the potential pathogenicity
and toxicity of the bacteria, the likelihood of its dissemination and o-site reproduction, and the impact of
release on atmospheric precipitation patterns.127
The court denied preliminary injunction. It found the plaintis had not made a strong showing that the EPA
had acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in arriving at its decision to grant AGS the permit.128
Foundation on Economic Trends v. Thomas129 { The \Financial Requirement" Case
In this suit, the plaintis (FET and Jeremy Rifkin) sought an order to require the EPA to modify its procedures
for authorizing release of genetically engineered pesticides into the environment. They argued that the EPA
should have promulgated regulations requiring documentation of nancial capability to redress and abate
any potential harms that may result from such releases on the part of the persons granted an experimental
use permit (see supra, the \Ice-Minus Bacteria" Case) to perform such experiments.130 The plaintis had
previously petitioned the EPA to promulgate, through rulemaking, regulations establishing \minimum nancial
responsibility standards" to be required of applicants for these permits. They had argued that the risks posed
by environmental releases were potentially devastating, and that the EPA did not have an adequate program for
assessing, controlling, and assuring remedial actions and accountability for the environmental risks presented
by the deliberate release of genetically engineered organisms.131
Without addressing the merits of the case, however, the Court dismissed the case for lack of standing on the
part of the plaintis. For the Foundation on Economic Trends, it found that the plainti's alleged injury to
its informational and educational functions was insucient because the interest was not within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by FIFRA.132 For Jeremy Rifkin, it found his allegation of injury to
his use and enjoyment of \the environmental resources of the United States," which substantially depended
on \the ecological and genetic diversity and biological integrity of thousands of wild plants and animals...
and of many domesticated plants and animals, and the stability and visibility of the biosphere which sustains
them,"133 to be \wholly abstract" and of \at most a hypothetical interest."134
Cases Involving Other Biotechnology Research Experiments
Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng135
The plaintis sought to suspend and revoke the license defendants had issued permitting marketing of a
pseudorabies vaccine. Prior to the lawsuit, the USDA Animal & Plant Health Inspection Service, which controls
the production and marketing of veterinary medicines including vaccines through a licensing process under
the Virus-Serum-Toxin Act (VSTA), had granted the license without preparing an environmental assessment
or impact statement. Upon petition by the Foundation on Economic Trends (plaintis) to revoke or suspend
the license, the agency suspended the license and prepared an environmental assessment which concluded that
the licensing of the virus would not have a signicant impact on the environment. The plaintis immediately
followed this conclusion by ling this lawsuit, claiming that the defendants had violated the VSTA and NEPA
(by performing an inadequate environmental assessment).136
The VSTA claim was dismissed for lack of standing on the narrow ground that the plaintis had failed to
show specicity of resource, use, enjoyment and injury.137 On plaintis' claim that the NEPA environmental
assessment was inadequate, the Court ruled in the defendants' favor, nding that the agency's conclusion in
the environmental assessment that the licensing of the vaccine posed no signicant impact was \not arbitrary
and capricious" and thus was adequate. In doing so, it noted that \some of the testing `deciencies' FET
[had recounted] reect[ed] the nascency of the eld of genetic engineering rather than truncated examination
of the [vaccine] by the agency."138 Thus, in this case, the Court signaled its concurrence with the position of
biotechnology advocates on a critical point of contention between anti and pro-biotechnology parties, namely
whether the practical inability to assess unknown risks should prevent the continued engagement of genetic
engineering research.
Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng139 { The \USDA Germplasm" Case { District Court
This lawsuit sought an injunction and a declaratory judgment against the USDA requiring it to prepare an
environmental impact statement with respect to its germplasm preservation program.
18The Court ruled against the plaintis on the ground that they had not identied any proposals for major
federal action signicantly aecting the quality of the human environment for which the NEPA would require
an impact statement.140
19Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng141 { The \USDA Germplasm" Case { Appellate Court
On appeal, the Court armed the lower court's decision on a procedural ground. Instead of deciding on
the merits, as the District Court had done, it found that the plaintis lacked standing to sue. The plaintis
had claimed \informational standing," which was a broadly-dened basis for standing that in some cases had
been available to organizations engaged in disseminating environmental information.142 Fearing that allowing
broad availability of informational standing would eliminate any standing requirement at all in NEPA cases, the
Court held that alleging \information" injury without identifying a particular agency action as the source of the
injury is insucient to gain informational standing. In this case, the Court found that the plaintis had failed
to identify an agency action amounting to a \major federal action" in the USDA's germplasm activities.143
Thus, while basing its holding on a procedural (standing) ground, the Court in fact also addressed the issue
of merit on which the lower court had ruled against the plaintis. This decision was more damaging to the
plaintis that it would initially appear, because by dismissing the case on the technical ground of standing, the
Court appeared to be signaling that it wished henceforth to restrict access by such plaintis to the courts for
litigation of similar issues on which the plaintis had previously been successful (see e.g., supra, Foundation on
Economic Trends v. Heckler).144 Indeed, there is supporting language in the opinion alluding to just such an
intention; the Court noted with approval the lower court's contention that the plaintis were seeking \judicial
involvement in day-to-day decision-making of the USDA."145
Foundation on Economic Trends v. Weinberger146
The plaintis sought to enjoin the construction of a proposed \Aerosol Test Facility" and \Toxic Agent Test
Support Facilities" by the Department of the Army. They contended that the defendants had failed to comply
with NEPA requirements by failing to prepare an environmental impact statement. The defendants argued
that such a statement was not required under the circumstances because they had made a legally adequate
and factually supported nding of no signicant environmental impact (in an environmental assessment).147
The plaintis contended that, contrary to the defendants' disclaimers, recombinant research geared towards
biological warfare would be performed at the proposed new facilities.148 In their view, recombinant DNA
research is precisely the type of \new and expanding technological advances" that concerned the drafters of the
NEPA. Therefore, the scope of the proposed federal action was in fact broader than that which the Army had
contemplated in its assessment nding no signicant environmental impact (and hence no requirement for an
impact statement).149 The defendants countered that while testing of new types of toxins and biological agents
had been contemplated, it had not actually been proposed, and thus no armative proposal to use recombinant
DNA had been made.150 The Court held against the defendants, nding that the Environmental Assessment151
published by the Army was \clearly inadequate" because it was merely \an amalgam of conclusory statements
and unsupported assertions of `no impact'."152 While agreeing with the defendants that they had not proposed
the use of genetically-altered material at the facilities, the Court nonetheless believed potential risks to the
environment remained, declaring, \Pathogenic agents and toxins, as well as non-pathogenic... microorganisms,
will be used in the... facility... [and the] possibility of an accident involving personnel, or exposure to the outside
environment, while low in probability, [do] exist. Clearly the risks are serious and far-reaching... and could
produce extraordinary, potentially irreparable, consequences."153 However, it is unclear whether, in expressing
its concerns so explicitly, the Court was mainly persuaded by the extreme nature of the recombinant DNA
materials involved (those of the biological warfare variety) or was inuenced and convinced by the plaintis'
contentions.
C. EFFORTS AGAINST BIOTECH RESEARCH THROUGH OPPOSING BIOTECHNOLOGY
PATENTS
Litigation
Jeremy Rifkin, through the Peoples Business Commission (the precursor to the FET), led a major amicus
brief in the nation's rst Supreme Court case on patenting genetically engineered forms of life.154 Rifkin's
reason for opposing patenting in this instance was probably several-fold. He correctly perceived that if scien-
tists could patent their genetic engineering products, and thus obtain property rights to them for the patent
duration, it would be a great incentive for the continued development of commercial biotechnology. Moreover,
the granting of these patents would lend an aura of legitimacy to recombinant DNA work and its resultant
products. Finally, granting a patent on a life form would be antithetical to his belief in species integrity and
sanctity.
The case, Diamond v. Chakrabarty,155 involved the patenting of a bacterium that had been genetically altered
to break down petroleum. In his amicus brief, Rifkin presented three main arguments for opposing the grant
of a patent for this bacterium.
20First, he argued that the experience in the single area in which Congress had specically authorized the
patenting of living organisms, namely through the Plant Patent Act of 1930 and the Plant Variety Protection
Act of 1970, showed that the patenting of any life form necessarily led to genetic and social impacts that were
contrary to the society's best interests. In support of this contention, he stated that plant patents had led to
the systematic elimination of many plant and crop varieties that were not patentable by virtue of being merely
products of nature; with the loss of genetic diversity, monoculturing becomes the dominant reality. Moreover,
plant breeding had become such a lucrative endeavor that there was an increasing concentration of basic plant
food supply ownership in the hands of a small number of large multinational corporations.156
Second, he contended that the technology of genetic engineering, taken as a whole, was not in the public
interest. Pointing to the unknown and potential risks of biotechnology, he argued that the public interest
would be endangered by the \[irreversible pollution of] the planetary gene pool in radically new ways" as a
result of the proliferation of genetic engineering techniques and novel life forms.157
Third, he argued that the patenting of lower organisms would invariably lead to the patenting of higher forms
of life. In support of this argument, he reasoned that recombinant DNA techniques will eventually lead to
genetic engineering of higher life forms (than bacteria), including humans, for which patenting will have to be
allowed based on the same rationale for allowing patenting of the bacterium in this case. This, he pointed out,
would raise moral and ethical issues involving a determination of \the very nature of life" itself.158
21The Supreme Court ultimately held, by a 5-4 vote, to allow the patenting of the bacterium. Even so, Rifkin
drew solace in the observation that the justices viewed their decision as a narrowly construed one. He noted
Justice Burger's reference to \the gruesome parade of horribles" outlined in his amicus brief as the latter
explained that the Court's decision was based on a logical interpretation of existing patent law and was not
intended to address the larger social issues surrounding the genetic engineering of life.159
Out-of-Court Opposition
Besides participating in legal challenges to the patenting of genetically engineered life forms, Rifkin was also
responsible for assembling major coalitions aimed at drawing attention to the issuing of such patents. In May of
1994, a coalition of hundreds of women's organizations from more than forty nations announced their collective
opposition to the attempt by Myriad Genetics, a U.S. biotechnology company, to patent the discovery of a
breast cancer gene. The next year, Rifkin organized a coalition of more than two hundred religious leaders,
from a broad range of denominations and faiths, which announced its opposition to the granting of patents on
animal and human genes, organs, tissues and organisms.160
RIFKIN'S EFFORTS AGAINST BIOTECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS
A.
BOVINE SOMATOTROPIN
22On November 5, 1993, the FDA approved the use of a genetically engineered form of a bovine growth hor-
mone (rBST) in dairy cows. This event sparked a series of high-prole protests that eventually culminated in
court challenges. By this time, Rifkin's reputation as an anti-biotechnology activist was well-established. Not
surprisingly, he immediately galvanized a broad grass-roots campaign to oppose rBST. rBST represented the
culmination of the technology of genetic engineering in that it was the rst genetically engineered product to
be commercially marketed. It thus represented the end product of the process the progress of which Rifkin
had been ghting to block throughout the previous decade.
rBST, the acronym for recombinant bovine somatotropin, is the genetically engineered version of bovine growth
hormone, which is a naturally occurring protein that cows ordinarily produce to direct nutrients toward milk
production.161 Prior to the arrival of genetic engineering techniques, the process of administering the hormone
to cows to induce lactation relied on injecting growth hormone-containing tissue extracts from dead cows into
live cows. The ineciency of this method precluded large-scale commercial use of the hormone.162 The arrival
of biotechnology changed this situation; genetic engineering techniques allowed for easy and mass production of
puried rBST that appeared to function similarly as natural BST.163 Among the four major U.S. corporations
that competed in the 1980s to develop recombinant BST, Monsanto was the eventual victor, after investing
$800 million in product development alone.164 Monsanto's rBST, Posilac, reportedly yielded a 15% to 25%
increase in milk production.165
The FDA began its review of the safety and ecacy of rBST in 1984,166 and nally approved its use in com-
mercial applications on November 12, 1993, after over 120 studies had been evaluated. It declared that milk
from treated cows was indistinguishable from milk from untreated cows, and therefore would not have to be
labeled.167 Congress accepted the FDA judgment in full.168 Milk, thus, became the rst food that the U.S.
Government allowed to be produced using a genetically engineered drug.
The FDA subsequently issued interim guidelines warning producers who label milk as coming from untreated
cows to ensure that those labels were neither false nor misleading. It reasoned that since all milk contains
natural BST, labels that said \BST-free" would be false and potentially misleading. Whether a label would
be false or misleading would be largely dependent on the context within which terms such as \BST-free"
appear on the label. Thus, the FDA guidelines suggested that labels indicating milk from untreated cows also
include disclaimers that state, for instance, that \no signicant dierence has been shown between milk from
rBST-treated and non-rBST-treated cows."169
Jeremy Rifkin, leading an organization called the \Pure Food Campaign (PFC)," immediately denounced the
use of rBST in agriculture, the commercial sale of milk from rBST-treated cows and the FDA's decision not to
require labeling. Turning his attention from opposing research involving recombinant DNA, he began earnestly
to oppose products involving the technology. He viewed rBST as a \test product" and \the key" to stopping
the progress of biotechnology.170 He predicted the ght against rBST to be a \battle that may take years"; he
was \determined [that as the rst genetically engineered product, rBST would] be dead on arrival."171
Rifkin demonstrated his talent at generating activist fervor by building a coalition of groups representing a
broad range of concerns. His PFC was joined by the Consumers Union, the Humane Society, the New Council
on Food Safety172, organic farmers and restaurateurs,173 among others.
The concerns of Rifkin and his fellow activists were wide-ranging. First, despite FDA assurances to the con-
trary,174 they had health worries about rBST. The primary concern stemmed from the incidence of mastitis
among rBST-treated cows, which they claimed was 79% higher than normal. This, they feared, would lead
to greater usage of antibiotics, which would stay in milk that was eventually consumed by humans; they rea-
soned that human consumption of the antibiotic residues would lead subsequently to ineectiveness of these
antibiotics against bacteria that aect humans.175 A second health concern was that residues of rBST would
appear in milk and cause allergic reactions in humans.176 They also contended that rBST would raise the level
of IGF-1, an insulin-like growth factor, in the milk of treated cows, and feared that this factor might interfere
with human metabolism and growth.177
Besides health concerns, the activists also protested the economic eects of rBST use on small dairy farmers.
They claimed that the benets of this expensive drug would accrue only to farmers with larger farms who
would be the ones able to aord it.178 Furthermore, they predicted that any further increase in milk production
due to rBST would further depress the already-beleaguered dairy industry through driving down prices in a
market characterized by milk surplus and government price subsidy.179
Although the health and economic concerns were important, they were probably not the only source of the
antagonism of Rifkin and his fellow activists. rBST touched upon the essence of their discomfort with biotech-
nology. The use of an \articial" chemical to produce something as pure, natural and wholesome as milk
represented the disregard for natural boundaries that Rifkin had criticized in his long-standing opposition to
biotechnology research.180
It is likely that Rifkin was further motivated by a fundamental distrust of the FDA (or any government agency,
for that matter). In response to the FDA's guidelines regarding the labeling of rBST milk, he and his fellow
activists accused the FDA of turning normal labeling practices on its head in an attempt to ensure that the
rst commercial use of a genetically engineered product was not rejected by the public. They claimed that
the FDA was \hiding the technology... [and did] not want the public to know [about milk produced with
it]."181 In essence, they did not trust the FDA's conclusions and claims that the product was safe. They
wanted consumers to be informed so they could make a decision whether or not to avoid substances such as
rBST. This, of course, would not be possible without labels that identied the presence of the substance in
the foods.182 Unfortunately, their suspicions were certainly not diminished by allegations of impropriety on
the part of FDA ocials.183
Rifkin also realized he had a perfect product on hand to generate public support for his activities. He was a
master at deciphering what the public's concerns were and how to speak to them. He correctly surmised that
public suspicions about genetic engineering would be especially intense when food is involved. At one point, he
reported that he was getting \hundreds and hundreds of calls, from concerned parents mostly."184 In another
adept move to focus public attention on the fact that their food supply was at issue, he successfully corralled
a nationwide coalition of chefs to denounce publicly (and loudly) genetically engineered foods.185
RIFKIN'S ACTIVITIES
Media publicity
Rifkin and his coalition engaged in a set of activities that were clearly (and successfully) calculated to gain
publicity and thus generate public awareness of rBST and it potential negative eects. They engaged constantly
with the press in promoting their concerns and opposition to rBST.186 Publicity was generated through \milk
dumping" protests against retailers that sold rBST milk187 and threats of a major boycott of all milk and
dairy products from rBST-treated cows. All dairy processors were asked to sign a \BST-free" pledge, with
a corresponding threat that all who refused would be listed on a national 900-number as rBST users; PFC
members also handed out rBST warning leaets at McDonald's restaurants in the United States and Canada.
Finally, there were even threats, though unrealized, of a major ad campaign.188
Lawsuits
Adopting a now familiar tactic, Rifkin also resorted to litigation to prevent the successful development and
commercialization of rBST.
Cordes v. Madigan189
This was a suit clearly aimed at halting rBST at its developmental stage. The plaintis recognized that rBST
could soon be the rst commercial application of a genetically engineered product. The suit was led before the
FDA had even approved the commercial use of rBST. At the time, the FDA had only permitted experimental
injections of rBST and approved the human consumption of test rBST dairy products. The plaintis were
dairy farmers, the FET and Jeremy Rifkin.190 They claimed that the defendants (USDA and the National
Dairy Promotion and Research Board) were promoting the use of rBST in violation of the Dairy Promotion
and Research Order191; the Order was aimed in part at promoting the use of uid milk and dairy products as
well as projects for research and nutrition education.192 The plaintis claimed that rBST may have detrimental
economic and health consequences.193
Evidencing his distrust of federal agencies, Rifkin claimed, as part of his basis for standing, harm by the
defendants' eorts to \disparage and discredit [him], particularly with regard to his eorts to inform the
public" about rBST use.194 The Court ruled that the FET and Rifkin lacked standing, and that the dairy
farmer-plaintis had not exhausted their administrative remedies prior to bringing the suit.195
Barnes v. Shalala196
Probably chastened by the dismissal for lack of standing to sue in most of the cases he had led previously, to
ensure that this suit progressed to the point of being adjudicated on its merits, Rifkin included a large group of
co-plaintis who represented an incredibly broad set of interests: Wisconsin dairy farmers, owners of Wisconsin
dairy processors, Wisconsin grocers and distributors, a veterinarian, a nutritional educator, a nurse, the editor
of a farm journal, all Wisconsinites, and the Foundation for Economic Trends, lead by Jeremy Rifkin.197 The
plaintis challenged the FDA's approval of rBST on three grounds: (1) that it was arbitrary and capricious
because the FDA did not consider health and safety issues related to the use of rBST; (2) that the defendants
did not require mandatory labeling of products from rBST-treated cows; and (3) that the defendants did
not conduct an adequate environmental assessment or issue an environmental impact statement assessing the
environmental eect of rBST approval. The plaintis requested a declaration that the defendants had failed
to perform their statutory duties, and further sought a permanent injunction suspending the approval of rBST
until the defendants had fullled their statutory obligations.198
The court dismissed the claims of the plainti farmers, sellers of dairy products, health care professionals, and
the Foundation on Economic Trends because these parties lacked the requisite \concrete and particularized"
injuries to attain standing.199 The claims of the consumers, however, were allowed to remain on all counts.200
Although the Court dealt with the case on procedural grounds, its reasoning appeared to deal a partial setback
to Rifkin. In nding that only the consumer plaintis had standing to sue the FDA regarding its approval of
rBST, and that only the consumers and farmers had standing on their environmental impact challenge, the
Court clearly took a position on how and what rBST issues would be considered in the legal arena.201 It
signaled that while it was ready to discuss health, safety and environmental concerns, it was not willing to
entertain other concerns about the nature or mistrust of corporate power and the government,202 which were
among the main concerns motivating Rifkin and his compatriots.
Stauber v. Shalala203
Following Barnes v. Shalala (see supra), the remaining plaintis re-led their claims. This time around, the
Court granted the defendants' request for summary judgment, ruling that the plaintis had failed to put any
material facts into dispute within the relevant, admissible evidence.204
In arriving at its opinion, the Court seemed to conrm the lower court's stance on what the relevant issues
were in the rBST controversy: it considered only scientic evaluations of health and safety.205 In reviewing
the evidence presented, it demonstrated substantial deference to the FDA.206 It implicitly acknowledged its
deference to the FDA's expertise when it noted that the FDA had made its conclusion despite \scientists,
economists, farmers and environmental and animal welfare organizations [who had] questioned the safety and
quality of [rBST]-derived products, [and] the thousands of letters from consumers [FDA had received] asking
it to deny approval of [rBST] or to require labeling of [rBST]-derived products." Besides assessing health
and safety concerns, the Court did not discuss the other concerns of opponents of rBST.207 Thus, the Court
essentially took objections on moral (non-scientic) grounds out of its legal reasoning.
23B.
FLAVR SAVR TOMATO
24In May, 1992, the FDA published a statement of policy for foods derived from new plant varieties, which
included plants developed by recombinant DNA techniques.208 It decreed that it would not require pre-market
approval of genetically altered food.209 It also said it would not require food developed using recombinant
DNA techniques to bear special labeling to reveal that fact to consumers; it believed the new techniques were
merely extensions at the molecular level of traditional methods and would be used to achieve the same goals
as pursued with traditional plant breeding.210 About 3,000 letters of opposition, many from members of the
Pure Food Campaign, were submitted to the FDA in response to this statement of policy.211 Rifkin and
his organization also led a petition with the FDA to require testing and labeling of genetically engineered
foods.212 In spite of this, the FDA maintained the position it had adopted in the policy statement.
The FDA's approval of Calgene, Inc.'s informal request to market its Flavr Savr tomato, which had been
genetically altered to achieve longer-lasting shelf life, was greeted with activist outcry. Rifkin called it \an
untested potential threat to the nation's health."213 He once again demanded the tomato be labeled to indicate
that it was genetically engineered.214
Rifkin expressed several concerns regarding the commercial sale of genetically engineered foods, of which the
Calgene tomato was the rst (rBST was a drug, and the milk from rBST cows was not actually genetically
altered). His concerns were premised upon the same environmental and ethical concerns he had expressed all
along in opposing biotechnology. These concerns were not allayed by the reassurances and counterarguments
of the FDA and other scientists.215
First, he argued that since genetically engineered food products are alive, they are unpredictable, being capable
of reproducing, mutating and migrating once released into the environment. He feared that the long-term
cumulative impact on the environment from the release of thousands of such products would be devastating.216
Calgene's tomato would merely be the rst of these products.
Second, the genetic transfer of genes that result in the development of products such as the Flavr Savr tomato
involves the crossing of species boundaries. This, he believed, went far beyond traditional breeding techniques.
To him, it represented the \ultimate oense to the dignity and integrity of the biotic community."217
Third, without labeling of genetically engineered foods, consumers would not be able to make an informed
choice when purchasing their foods. In one of its handouts, the Pure Food Campaign warned consumers that
unprecedented genetic combinations, including cantaloupe and yellow squash containing bacteria and virus
genes, potatoes with chicken and waxmoth genes, tomatoes with ounder and tobacco genes, and sh and
pork with human genes, were being introduced into their food supply. It was further argued that without
mandatory labeling, and testing, food producers might scramble plant and animal genes indiscriminately
without care for consumers' health and safety and the long-term impact on the global food supply. 218 Rifkin
worried, for instance, that new genes that were previously not part of foods would turn out to be allergenic
and be consumed inadvertently by people allergic to the allergens.219
Fourth, Rifkin was concerned about the long-term risk posed by the marker gene220 that was inserted into
the Flavr Savr tomato during the gene transfer process. In this case, the marker gene encoded an antibiotic
resistance product which would neutralize the eectiveness of the antibiotic kanamycin. Rifkin speculated that
this marker gene could somehow be taken up by disease-causing bacteria in a person's gut and thus render the
bacteria resistant to kanamycin.221
ACTIVITIES
Public Eorts
In opposing the Calgene tomato, Rifkin, through the PFC, again engaged in high-prole activities clearly aimed
at generating media publicity to their cause. PFC members contacted about 1800 local lawmakers nationwide to
urge them to introduce local ordinances requiring grocery stores and restaurants that sold or served genetically
engineered foods to display signs proclaiming that fact. They also pushed the FDA to set up a registry of
genetically engineered foods so that the agency could track down a food's producer if problems occurred.222 In
a massive coalition-building eort, the PFC also recruited restaurants, grocery stores, distributors and growers
to join its boycott of genetically engineered foods;223 at one stage, more than 1,500 restaurant chefs had joined
with the PFC,224 and Burger King Corporation demanded proof that the genetically-altered food (referring to
the Calgene tomato) was as good as what the chain was using at the time.225 Similar to its action in the rBST
case, the PFC organized \tomato dumpings" wherever the Calgene tomato was sold.226 In another highly
unorthodox, and probably eective, move, Rifkin and his PFC targeted 140,000 school teachers nationwide
with \educational materials" that listed the downsides of genetically engineered foods such as the Calgene
tomato, which they were asked to discuss with their students.227 Rifkin also publicly pledged to le lawsuits
against \each and every producer of... [genetically engineered foods] to insure... [that such food was] only used
if it [was] proved safe."228
One of the most dramatic aspects of Rifkin's campaign involved a direct confrontation with Campbell Soup
Co., which had previously signed an exclusive licensing agreement with Calgene to market fresh tomatoes in
North America, with the right to use the Flavr Savr tomatoes in its processed products. Rifkin and his PFC
group announced that they intended to launch an international boycott campaign against Campbell and its
products. In a letter to Campbell's president and CEO, they warned the company that unless it halted its
development and marketing of genetically engineered tomatoes within thirty days, its products would be the
focus of a worldwide education and boycott eort.229 Although it is unclear what eect Rifkin's threat had
on Campbell, because the company immediately denied Rifkin's announcement that Campbell had \bowed"
to the threat, the company did announce that they had no plans to sell the tomato and noted that its right
to sell fresh Flavr Savr tomatoes in North America had been sold back to Calgene. Furthermore, although it
retained the right to sell fresh tomatoes elsewhere and processed tomato anywhere, it said it did not have plans
to do so. Curiously, after applauding Campbell's apparent sensitivity to consumer concerns, Rifkin declared
he would boycott Campbell products anyway because the company had not promised never to sell genetically
engineered tomatoes.230
Lawsuits
Despite Rifkin's early public threats of suit,231 he did not challenge the FDA's policy guidelines on the approval
and labeling of the Flavr Savr tomato and other genetically engineered foods until about four years later. In
May, 1998, Rifkin's PFC joined with a diverse coalition in ling a lawsuit against the FDA seeking the removal
of genetically engineered foods from the market until they are tested and labeled. The suit claimed that
the FDA's refusal to require testing and labeling of such foods could potentially cause harm to American
consumers. This suit is pending in the District Court of the District of Columbia.232
CONCLUSION: IMPACT AND IMPLICATIONS
After all is said and done, it is a rather surprising realization that all of Rifkin's eorts in his years of opposing
biotechnology did not yield more than a minimal measure of success procedurally and substantively in the
exercise and regulation of the technology. His opposition to research did not prevent it from moving forward;
on the contrary, biotechnology today is more vibrant than ever. For instance, gene therapy experimentation is
proceeding rapidly233 and the technical foundation for human cloning is being developed at breakneck speed.234
Also, patenting of genetically engineered life forms is now commonplace. Furthermore, the FDA did not budge
from its initial position regarding how it would regulate genetically engineered foods and drugs. Indeed, while
it is dicult to gauge what impact there was on the commercialization of rBST and Calgene's tomato, since
many factors (such as product quality and marketing) aect market success, both of these products are, if
not phenomenal successes, nonetheless clearly here to stay.235 Rifkin's only obvious success came in a few
lawsuits that resulted in placing procedural obstacles in federal agencies' (and thus the industry's) engagement
in biotechnology-related activities. For instance, the requirement for environmental impact assessments and
statements was claried.
It would be myopic, however, to conclude that just because there were no obvious changes in research policy
and government regulation directly resulting from Rifkin's eorts that his opposition was fruitless. His actions
are likely responsible for at least two negative eects in the biotechnology industry.
25The public opposition to the pioneering biotechnology products may have resulted in the curtailment of the
industry's development and introduction of similar commercial biotechnology products. Genetically engineered
food products have accounted for only a tiny percentage of biotechnology products that have entered the
marketplace since the Calgene tomato. In 1997, less than 5 percent of biotechnology products was genetically
engineered foods, with the rest being crop protection products. 236 This trend suggests that while industry
interest in genetica engineering of commercial goods such as agricultural protection products has persisted,
there has not been as much progress on the food product front. It is reasonable to conclude that had rBST
and Flavr Savr been greeted with a more positive market response, the industry would have jumped on the
bandwagon to develop and commericalize other genetically engineered foods.
Also, Rifkin's eorts ultimately hurt the cause of biotechnology in a manner that would result in the most
damage, namely through calling into question in the public eye the credibility of the FDA. The FDA, as the
nation's arbiter of what foods and drugs are safe and eective for the consumption of Americans, serves as
the gatekeeper for biotechnology products seeking entry into the American marketplace. And its function in
this regard is tremendously dependent on the American public's condence in its eectiveness in keeping out
harmful products. The onslaught of extremely negative publicity, and the accompanying public denunciation
and boycott of rBST/rBST milk and the Calgene tomato, all of which were biotechnology products that had
been certied safe by the FDA, tarnished the image and credibility of the FDA, in general, and specically
in relation to biotechnology products. Thus, Rifkin's eorts succeeded in wresting away the one legitimizing
stamp of approval the industry had for its products.
26Nonetheless, even Rifkin must realize that biotechnology is here to stay and that discrediting federal agencies,
such as the FDA, that are entrusted with serving the public good, is not the most benecial outcome for the
American public in the long run. As such, it is important to recognize that there are aspects of their activities
that Rifkin and his fellow activists could have done dierently that might have led to a more constructive
overall outcome in the whole biotechnology debate.
It is important that Rifkin recognize that hyperbole and doomsday-type sound bites do not belong in debates
with individuals whose vocation is by denition steeped in the objective realm of science. Ocials at federal
agencies like the FDA, the NIH and in the biotechnology industry are trained to make decisions based on
the scientic method. Rifkin's habit was ineective with, and apparently infuriating to, these people, and all
the more so because they believed that he was eectively misleading the public. Under these antagonistic
circumstances, it is no wonder that neither side was willing to \listen" to the other.
Rifkin should have realized that his insistence on total abolition of biotechnology was untenable. First, even
if biotechnology were stopped in the U.S., it would continue elsewhere in the world. And, as he himself has
pointed out, one of the distinctive dangers of genetically engineered entities is their potential for wreaking
havoc with the environment, which is a parameter that recognizes no geopolitical boundaries. Second, his ba-
sis for banning the technology, which is the potential risks associated with it, is antithetical to the experience
with and premise of all technological advances. All new technologies have inherent uncertainties, and this is
a reality that the FDA recognized when it promulgated its policy on foods derived from processes involving
recombinant DNA.237 Thus, unless Rifkin had proposed an alternative path by which society could continually
better its condition without accessing new technology, it would have been impossible, even arguably uncon-
scionable, to abandon promising advances such as biotechnology.
If Rifkin had recognized that biotechnology was here to stay, he could have chosen to participate in eorts to
ensure the safest implementation possible of the technology, rather than continuing a vain eort to obstruct
it. In this regard, Rifkin should have abandoned the strategy of engaging in procedural maneuvers aimed at
blocking the technology under the guise of ensuring proper adherence to regulatory technicalities. For example,
most of his lawsuits involved claims that federal agencies (e.g. FDA for rBST, USDA for deliberate release
experiments) acted arbitrarily and capriciously in arriving at their decisions and that they violated the NEPA
in their environmental impact considerations. While these are important issues (certainly in the case of envi-
ronmental impact), it was obvious, as some courts noted, that they constituted, at best, short-term procedural
obstacles against biotechnology, or, at worst, the irritating desperate acts of one who had previously lost in
the battle to decide the technology's fate. Instead of engaging in these pursuits, Rifkin could have re-directed
his concerns about risk assessment from one of requiring absolute certainty through exhaustive data gathering
(which, of course, was impossible without rst performing the research experiments in question) to a more
practical demand for examination of potential risks based on the best technology and information available
at the time of the experiments, and for the establishment of reasonable precautionary measures in the perfor-
mance of said experiments.
Finally, Rifkin should have chosen more constructive avenues of opposition. Policy-making through litigation
is clearly a dubious endeavor, especially when dealing with an issue with broad-ranging implications such as
biotechnology. Once the federal government had made its policy choice to promote the development of biotech-
nology, as reected in the establishment of a coordinated framework for the regulation of biotechnology,238
participating agencies like the FDA were obliged to establish policies that would not impede the technology
without cause.239 Thus, the most eective, and arguably democratic, means subsequently for challenging
these policies was through the political process. As he demonstrated in his success at galvanizing grassroots
opposition to rBST and the Flavr Savr, Rifkin certainly would have been capable of promoting his cause by
inuencing biotechnology legislation through the normal political process.
On the other hand, not all the blame for the tarnishment of the image and credibility of the FDA and the
biotechnology industry can be attributed to Rifkin alone. Regulatory agencies such as the FDA, research
scientists and the industry could have done a few things dierently as well.
There should have been greater recognition of the moral and ethical concerns relevant to the debate over the
science and technology of genetic engineering. Instead of adhering strictly to the dogma that only scientically-
recognized concerns are relevant in assessment of risks of new technology, biotechnology proponents should
have realized that biotechnology is unlike past technologies in that its power and potential derived from the
very fact that it involves the uncharted territory of the blueprint of life, and, consequently, the essence of who
and what human beings think they are. Teleological and mystical as this may sound, most of the public were
concerned by, or at least disturbed by the possibility of, issues arising from such an \invasion." As a corollary,
they should have acknowledged the fact that people like Rifkin were merely giving voice to some common
public concerns, albeit with an arguably unnecessarily apocalyptic tone. And because Rifkin's concerns were
ones held by at least some segment of the public, they merited debate and possibly even incorporation into
policy decisions.
Biotechnology proponents should also have recognized that precisely because the technology is as powerful as
it is, it would have been greeted with greater apprehension among the public than any other past technology.
As such, it was imperative that the technology be eased onto the public consciousness through a gradual
process. For instance, the FDA could have taken a compromise position in its decision on the labeling of
rBST milk. Instead of relying on a seemingly convoluted interpretation of the \false or misleading" labeling
requirement with regard to rBST milk, the FDA could have initially allowed such labeling. Such a move would
have avoided outcry from a public that clearly felt important information was being forcibly kept from them
by FDA's restrictive labeling requirement in this particular case. By allowing such labeling, market economics
would then decide whether the product would be accepted by the public. Through education, marketing and
eective pricing, consumers who did not have strong opinions against the product would likely buy them,
or at least try them, at some point, and those who opposed them might eventually even be persuaded that
their concerns were unwarranted when enough time had passed uneventfully. By engaging in the restrictive
approach it did, the FDA unnecessarily imposed \unwanted" products on the very public that had relied on it
for protection, and, in the process, gave credence to biotechnology opponents' accusation that it was seeking
to promote industry welfare over the people's safety. The FDA's (and the industry's) gamble that the public
could be \coerced" into accepting genetically engineered food products was miscalculated. To this day, years
after the introduction of rBST and Flavr Savr, opposition continues unabated. A 1998 report states that
Greenpeace has joined with Chef Collaborative 2000 in an eort to persuade consumers to ght for labeling
of genetically engineered food through a signature collection campaign to petition the FDA.240
Because of the controversy surrounding the technology and the visible industry interests involved, federal reg-
ulatory agencies such as the FDA should have taken greater eorts to insure impartiality. In this regard, mere
allegations of impropriety, such as the one involving FDA ocials accused of being closely allied with Monsanto
and inuencing rBST's approval,241 can be disproportionately damaging indeed. Thus, federal agencies should
have taken stringent measures to avoid conicts of interest, both perceived and real.
The agencies should also have made a good faith eort at addressing the issue of risk assessment regarding the
technology. While it is certainly true that the actual dangers of the technology could not have been assessed
denitively without going forward with the experiments in question, the agencies and the industry could have
made a more concerted eort to develop alternative ways to assess the potential dangers. For instance, there
could have been more investment in improving existing methods of predicting risks through the use of computer
modeling.
Finally, promulgation of new rules specic to biotechnology might have been a better approach to the regulation
of biotechnology. In this regard, the FDA, instead of deciding that it could regulate under existing statutes,
could have encouraged Congress to enact a new statute specic to biotechnology. The process of promulgat-
ing this regulation would have opened up a public debate over the various issues relating to the technology,
thus possibly giving the eventual law a legitimacy that people like Rifkin believed the existing regulations, as
promulgated by the FDA based on existing statutes, lacked. During this process, it is very likely that novel
measures or frameworks of regulation would have been enacted to deal with biotechnology-specic issues. For
instance, the liability scheme of risks resulting from biotechnology products could have been tailored to place
the cost of remedying harm strictly on the industry; under this scheme, some of the concerns of the public
might have been allayed because of the assurance that the industry had an incentive to make their products
as safe as possible.
As we approach an era when many biotechnology products, many of a nature never seen before, are about
to enter the market, it is particularly critical that all parties in the biotechnology debate assess the valuable
lessons that can be culled from past battles over biotechnology. The opponents of biotechnology need to rec-
ognize that the technology is here to stay and decide whether it wants to participate in making the best of it
or engage in obstructive eorts that experience has shown to be of limited eect. Proponents of biotechnology,
on the other hand, must recognize the legitimacy of non-scientic viewpoints and remember that the public is
the ultimate arbiter of what they will accept, and thus cannot be excluded from the decision-making process.
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